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Abstract. Device independent quantum key distribution aims to provide a higher
degree of security than traditional QKD schemes by reducing the number of
assumptions that need to be made about the physical devices used. The previous
proof of security by Pironio et al. applies only to collective attacks where the state
is identical and independent and the measurement devices operate identically for each
trial in the protocol. We extend this result to a more general class of attacks where
the state is arbitrary and the measurement devices have no memory. We accomplish
this by a reduction of arbitrary adversary strategies to qubit strategies and a proof
of security for qubit strategies based on the previous proof by Pironio et al. and
techniques adapted from Renner.
1. Introduction
Traditional quantum key distribution protocols rely on a model of the physical devices
being used which involves a number of assumptions, such as the dimension of the Hilbert
space, the measurement performed, uniform behaviour of detectors, etc.. The actual
devices used may deviate from the model and an in-depth knowledge of the system
in question is necessary to decide if the assumptions are valid, or the extent to which
they are invalid. If the assumptions are not satisfied, then there exists the possibility
of information leaking to the adversary. Device independent quantum key distribution
aims to reduce the number of security assumptions that need to be made in order to
obtain a provably secure key from a quantum key distribution protocol.
Device independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) aims to replace the model
of the physical devices with physically testable or enforceable assumptions. In particular,
the protocols test the extent to which the physical devices can violate a Bell inequality
and use this to bound the amount of information leaking to the adversary. Device
independence refers to the fact that no knowledge of the internal mechanism of the
devices is necessary, and in fact the devices may be provided by the adversary. The
participants in the protocol only need to observe sufficient violation of a Bell inequality
to prove security of the protocol.
Rather than starting from traditional quantum key distribution protocols, DIQKD
builds on protocols based on causality constraints. Work on these protocols began with
[BHK05], and an efficient protocol was introduced in [AMP06]. The security proofs
for these protocols were generalized to the scenario of global attacks by non-signalling
adversaries in [MRW+06] and [Mas08]. These protocols were first considered in the
context of quantum adversaries in [ABG+07] with a rigourous proof of security against
collective attacks appearing in [PAB+09].
The DIQKD protocols considered to date rely on Bell tests to quantify security.
Currently, assumptions need to be made in order to perform a Bell test and derive a
security bound. Previous proofs applied only to collective attacks, which assume that
the devices can be used repeatedly and the different trials are all independent and
identical. The current work aims to weaken the assumptions by allowing the trials to
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be different and correlated. The remaining restriction is that there is no memory from
one trial to the next.
1.1. The protocol
The protocol that we use was originally described in [AMP06] and shown to be secure
against collective quantum attacks in [ABG+07] and [PAB+09]. Two parties, Alice
and Bob, share a small amount of secret key and wish to expand this into a larger
key. They have access to an uncharacterized device which emits bipartite states,
connected by quantum channels to a pair of uncharacterized measurement devices.
Alice’s measurement device has three settings, while Bob’s has two. Finally, they have
access to a insecure classical channel. They use some secret key to authenticate data
sent on the classical channel.
(i) Before beginning, Alice randomly chooses a list of m trials to be used for parameter
estimation which she sends to Bob encrypted, using some private key bits.
(ii) For each trial, Alice and Bob request a state from the source. If the trial is to be
used for parameter estimation, Alice and Bob choose their measurement settings
uniformly at random from {0, 1}. Otherwise Alice chooses setting 2 and Bob chooses
setting 0.
(iii) After all trials are completed, Alice and Bob announce their measurement settings.
(iv) Alice randomly flips each measurement outcome and announces whether or not she
does so. Bob flips his outcomes whenever Alice does.
(v) Alice and Bob publicly announce a permutation and reorder their trials according
to this permutation.
(vi) Alice and Bob estimate S (defined below) from the parameter estimation trials.
(vii) Alice and Bob perform error correction on the remaining trials, correcting Alice’s
outcomes to correspond with Bob’s, resulting in the raw key.
(viii) Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification on the raw key according to the secure
key rate predicted by S.
The above protocol could be efficiently implemented using quantum apparatus by
a source of qubit pairs in the state |φ+〉 = 1√2 | 00〉+ 1√2 | 11〉, with Alice’s measurements
given by the operators X , Y , and X+Y√
2
. Bob’s measurement operators are X+Y√
2
and
X−Y√
2
. The security comes from the fact that in order to achieve a high value of S, the
state that Alice and Bob measure must be close to |φ+〉 and hence Bob’s measurements
are uncorrelated with Eve. The efficiency of the protocol comes from the fact that
Alice can align her measurement with Bob’s a significant amount of the time and obtain
strongly correlated results, so long as she chooses the other measurements often enough
to detect any deviation in the state from |φ+〉.
Instead of choosing which trials to use for parameter estimation in advance, Alice
and Bob may choose their settings independently, saving some key. This introduces
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trials which are unusable (when Alice chooses 2 and Bob chooses 1) and unless Bob
chooses 0 and 1 uniformly, there will be some parameter estimation settings that occur
more than others. Conceptually it is easier to suppose that the parameter estimation
trials are first chosen and then the settings chosen uniformly.
In [ABG+07] and [PAB+09] the protocol requires that Alice and Bob symmetrize
their data by randomly flipping their outcomes according to a random string which is
publicly broadcast. This simplifies analysis by allowing constraints to be placed on the
quantum state. However, the symmetrization procedure need not be done in practice
since it does not change the amount of information leaked to an adversary; Eve may
account for the symmetrization in her own analysis after observing the public random
string. Here we will assume the symmetrization has been done.
1.2. CHSH inequality
The CHSH inequality, originally derived in [CHSH69], is a Bell inequality utilizing
two measurement settings and two measurement outcomes for two parties. The two
parties, Alice and Bob, each randomly apply one of the two measurement operators to
a bipartite state ρ and compare outcomes. The measurement operators are Aa and Bb,
where a, b ∈ {0, 1} are the measurement settings for Alice and Bob, respectively. Aa
and Bb are Hermitian operators with eigenvalues 1 and -1. The CHSH inequality may
be expressed as
S =
∑
a,b=0,1
tr (Aa ⊗ Bbρ) (−1)ab ≤ 2 (1)
for local classical strategies, with an upper bound of 2
√
2 for quantum strategies.
Equivalently, we may use uniformly distributed random variables a, b ∈ {0, 1} for the
measurement settings and random variables x, y ∈ {0, 1} for measurement outcomes,
and derive the inequality
p = P (x⊕ y = ab) ≤ 0.75 (2)
for local classical strategies, with an upper bound of cos2 pi
8
∼ 0.85 for quantum
strategies. We say that a trial is successful if x ⊕ y = ab. The values p and S are
related by
S = 8p− 4 (3)
Both of these quantities will be useful in this paper. We will be interested in
the maximum value of S or p achievable by a state ρ, maximized over all possible
measurements. We denote these values by Smax(ρ) and pmax(ρ).
1.3. Security against collective attacks
As described above, the protocol could be performed using the same devices over and
over. Pironio et al. ([PAB+09]) originally considered security against collective attacks,
which relies on the assumption that the devices operate identically each time, and have
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no memory of the previous trials. For the source this means that state emitted over
n trials has the form ρ⊗n. A physical implementation using devices that are used
repeatedly must meet the following assumptions
• On each trial the source emits ρ
• The combined state that the source emits is ρ⊗n
• The measurement devices have no memory
Pironio et al. showed that if Alice and Bob estimate the value of the CHSH operator
to be S (settings 0 and 1 for Alice), and they estimate their bit error rate to be q (setting
2 for Alice), then they may extract a secret key at the asymptotic rate of
1− h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
− h(q). (4)
1.4. Main result and overview of proof
The main result in this paper is to show that the protocol described in [ABG+07] is
secure with the same asymptotic key rate against a wider class of attacks. For our proof
we suppose that all trials are performed on separate devices that do not communicate
with one another. This may seem more restrictive, but in fact it is a relaxation since
the states may be arbitrary rather than product states, and the devices do not have to
operate identically.
A physical implementation of this scheme with many devices is clearly impractical.
A practical implementation with single devices used sequentially could be made, with
only the following assumption‡ :
• The measurement devices have no memory
The model that we use in the proof is that the state is divided into many parts, and each
trial corresponds to a measurement that operates on only one part. By assuming the
measurement device has no memory and using it sequentially (providing measurement
settings and states one at a time, and receiving the outcome before the next state and
setting are given) this condition is enforced.
The source may emit any type of state, which may include a complete specification
on how the measurement devices are to operate on a particular trial. There is no
restriction on the dimension of the state or on the form of the measurement operators.
Another important consideration is that there are no losses. That is to say, there is no
provision for cases when no outcome is given. We may deal with this by assigning a
‡ Of course, Alice and Bob’s devices must not leak information back to Eve. Additionally, the
measurement devices must not communicate with each other in order to ensure that measurement
settings are not leaked. These conditions are met if we assume that Alice and Bob’s labs do not leak
information, which is a requirement for any scheme to remain secure. Additionally, Alice and Bob must
have sources of randomness that are uncorrelated with Eve. Again, this is a basic requirement for any
scheme.
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random outcome, which simply adds to the noise, or by adding assumptions, such the
adversary having no control over the losses once the measurement settings are given.
The proof relies heavily on [Ren05], chapter 6 and [PAB+09]. Two important
contributions are made. The first is to deal with the unknown dimension of the state,
since the finite de Finetti theorem used ([Ren07] and [Ren05]) is sensitive to dimension
which in our case is unknown and unbounded. The second modification is in parameter
estimation. The proof of security in [Ren05] assumes that the measurement operators
are constant and known, while in our case neither of these is true. Finally, we adapt
the security bounds of [PAB+09] to work within Renner’s security proof, obtaining the
final key rate.
We will first prove security in the case where the states on each trial are restricted
to a pair of qubits, which will fix the dimension and allow us to apply the finite de
Finetti theorem. Later we prove that this is sufficient.
2. Proof of security for qubit strategies
In this section we restrict our attention to the case where the state source emits a
pair of qubits and the devices each measure one of these qubits. Our proof of security is
derived from the one given by Renner in [Ren05]. The main difference is in the parameter
estimation. Central to the argument is the finite quantum de Finetti theorem published
in [Ren07].
The first set of states that we will concern our self with are states in the symmetric
subspace ofH⊗n along |φ〉⊗n−r, which is the subspace spanned by states which are of the
form |φ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |φ′〉 for any | φ′〉 on r subsystems, or any state obtained by permuting
the subsystems of such a state. This subspace is important because the states in it
are very close to symmetric product states, which are very nice to work with. We will
denote it by Sym(H, |φ〉⊗n−r). The finite quantum de Finetti theorem allows us to
break symmetric states into a mixture of these near-product states.
Theorem 1 (Renner [Ren07] Theorem 4.3.2). Let ρ ∈ H⊗n+k be a pure, permutationally
invariant state and let 0 ≤ r ≤ n. There exists a measure ν on the normalized pure
states of H, and for each normalized pure state |φ〉 in H a pure density operator ρφ on
Sym(H, |φ〉⊗n−r) such that∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣trk(ρ)−
∫
ρφν(φ)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 2 exp
(
− k(r + 1)
2(n + k)
+
1
2
dim(H) ln k
)
(5)
Here trk means tracing out any k subsystems. The general strategy for the security
proof will be to use the fact that the 1-norm is non-increasing under quantum operations
combined with the triangle inequality to finally put a bound on the distance between
the key obtained by applying the protocol to ρ and the ideal key which is uniform and
uncorrelated with Eve.
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2.1. Parameter estimation
At this point we need to develop techniques for estimating the CHSH value of states
which are nearly symmetric product states in the sense introduced in the previous
section. This is analogous to Theorem 4.5.2 in [Ren05]. However, in that case the
measurement operations on each subsystem are all known and identical. In our case
the measurements are not in our control, and we may have no description of them.
Fortunately this is not a very important issue. The CHSH value that can be achieved
by a particular state is a property of the state itself. If the measurements used are not
optimal, then the observed CHSH value can only be lower than if the measurements
are optimal. Since we are only interested in lower bounding the CHSH value, this is
sufficient. Any CHSH value that we observe will (leaving statistical fluctuations aside)
be a lower bound on the maximum CHSH value achievable by the state.
Lemma 1 (Parameter estimation). Let |ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H2 ⊗ H2, |φ〉⊗n+m−r) and let
p = pmax(|φ〉) be the maximum expected value for success on the CHSH test on | φ〉,
optimized over all measurements. Let Y be the number of successes after conducting
the CHSH test on the first m subsystems of |ψ〉 according to any measurement strategy.
Then for µ > 0
P (Y/m > p + µ) ≤ exp −2(mµ− r(1− p))
2
(n− r)cos4π/8 + (n+m)h(
r
n +m
) ln 2 (6)
The proof has two main steps. The first is to bound the given probability for states
of the form | φ〉⊗m−r ⊗ |φ′〉, up to permutations of subsystems. Next we use a lemma
of Renner that says |ψ〉 can be expressed as a superposition of a small number of such
states and use another lemma of Renner which bounds how much the probability can
change for such superpositions.
Proof. We now suppose our system is in the state |ψ′〉 = |φ〉⊗m−r⊗| φ′〉 for some |φ′〉 on
r subsystems. (We may also permute the subsystems without changing the argument.)
Let Xj be the random variable corresponding to the success or failure of the CHSH test
on the jth subsystem for the measurement strategy actually used (which may vary with
j). Since the measurement strategy cannot do better than the optimal strategy, we have
E(Xj) < p for 1 ≤ j ≤ m− r and E(Xj) < cos2 pi8 for j > m− r. Applying Hoeffding’s
inequality ([Wik]) to the first m− r subsystems, we obtain for t > 1
Pr
(
m−r∑
j=1
Xj > (m− r)(p+ t)
)
≤ e
−2(m−r)t2
cos4 pi8 . (7)
The remaining r subsystems cannot add very much if r is small. Thus
Pr
(
m∑
j=1
Xj > m(p+ t) + r (1− p− t)
)
≤ e
−2(m−r)t2
cos4 pi8 . (8)
where m(p + t) + r(1 − p− t) = (m − r)(p + t) + r and the additional r upperbounds
the value of
∑m
j=m−r+1Xj.
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We now turn our attention back to |ψ〉. Let z be an m-tuple with zj = 1 if the
jth trial is successful and zj = 0 if it is a failure. We may write the measurement
operator for the CHSH tests together as one large projective measurement {Mz} with
Mz the projector corresponding to the outcomes of success and failure given according
to z. Then the probability of getting the success/failure outcomes according to z is
〈ψ |Mz |ψ〉. Note that Mz is positive semi-definite.
We are only interested in the number of successful outcomes, which is given by
w(z), the Hamming weight of z. We can restate the above result as∑
w(z)>m(p+t)+r(1−p−t)
〈ψ′ |Mz |ψ′〉 ≤ e
−2(m−r)t2
cos4 pi8 (9)
Now suppose that |ψ〉 is in Sym(H, |φ〉⊗n+m−r). We can express |ψ〉 as a
superposition of states of the form | φ〉n+m−r ⊗ | φ′〉 up to permutations of subsystems.
We can apply the above argument to each of these terms in the superposition. We
are only measuring m of the subsystems, so depending on the permutation anywhere
between m− r and m of the subsystems may be in the state |φ〉. Note that our bound
still applies since the last r subsystems are arbitrary. The following two lemmas from
[Ren05] bound how much error may be introduced by this procedure.
Lemma 2 (Renner [Ren05] Lemma 4.5.1). Let |ψ〉 =∑x∈X |x〉 and let P be a positive
semi-definite operator, then
〈ψ |P |ψ〉 ≤ |X|
∑
x∈X
〈x |P | x〉 (10)
Lemma 3 (Renner [Ren05] Lemma 4.1.6). Let |ψ〉 be a state in Sym(H, |φ〉⊗n−r).
Then there exist orthogonal vectors |x〉, which are permutations of |φ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |φx〉 for
x ∈ X such that |ψ〉 is in the span of the |x〉 for various x, and |X| ≤ 2nh(r/n) where
h(·) is the binary Shannon entropy.
Applying these results we obtain∑
w(z)>m(p+t)+r(1−p−t)
〈ψ |Mz |ψ〉 ≤ e
−2(m−r)t2
cos4 pi8 2(n+m)h(
r
n+m
). (11)
Rewriting as a probability, we get
P (Y > m(p + t) + r (1− p− t)) ≤ e
−2(m−r)t2
cos4 pi8 2(n+m)h(
r
n+m
) (12)
or, equivalently
P (Y/m > p + µ) ≤ exp
(−2(mµ− r(1− p))2
(m− r)cos4π/8 + (n+m)h(
r
n +m
) ln 2
)
(13)
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2.2. Security
Security for qubit strategies follows from the same proof as Theorem 6.5.1 in [Ren05],
with different parameters. Since the proof is laid out in great detail in [Ren05] we will
only sketch the proof and indicate the necessary changes.
We begin with a symmetric state n + m + k pairs of qubits, which we purify
(according to Lemma 4.2.2 of [Ren05]) on Eve’s system to a pure symmetric state ρ.
According to the finite quantum de Finetti theorem, we may drop k subsystems and
obtain ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣trk(ρ)−
∫
ρφν(φ)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 2
9
ǫ (14)
with ρφ ∈ Sym(H⊗42 , |φ〉⊗n+m−r) and r depending on n,m, k, ǫ according to table
6.2 of [Ren05]. We next apply parameter estimation by measuring m systems with
measurement settings chosen uniformly for Alice and Bob, and determine the number
of CHSH successes, y. Then y
m
is our estimate of p. If this estimate is below some
threshold, pthres+µ (pthres is used to determine the key rate in the privacy amplification
phase) we abort and map the state to 0. According to Lemma 1, if we choose µ to be
µ =
4r
m
√(
− ln 2ǫ
9
− (n+m)h
(
r
n +m
)
ln 2
)
(m− r) cos4 π
8
. (15)
then the true value of p is lower than the estimate minus µ, only with probability less
than 2
9
ǫ. Thus we may apply the parameter estimation to obtain∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ρPE −
∫
V
ρPEφ ν(φ)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 4
9
ǫ (16)
where we restrict the integral to the set of states |φ〉 which have CHSH probability of
success pthres or higher (denoted by V ). The PE superscripts indicate the application
of the parameter estimation protocol.
We now have (if the protocol did not abort) a state ρPE which is nearly
indistinguishable from a mixture of near-product states with CHSH success probability
better than pthres. We may now characterize the smooth min entropy of this family of
states and apply privacy amplification, deriving a security bound. A parameterization of
the states appears in [PAB+09], equations (28) through (31). However, the calculation
is essentially the same as it appears in [Ren05] and is beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, we will appeal to the final result and calculate the asymptotic key rate.
In [Ren05], Corollary 6.5.2 we find the asymptotic key rate after privacy
amplification to be
min
σAB :Smax(σAB)≥S
H(X|E)−H(X|Y ) (17)
with H(X|E) and H(X|Y ) evaluated for state σAB, and S = 8pthres − 4, while X and
Y are the classical outcomes for Alice and Bob upon measuring σAB. The system E is
Eve’s system, which we take to be a purification of σAB. Additionally, we must minimize
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over measurement strategies of Bob’s devices consistent with producing a CHSH value
of S or better.
We now evaluate the minimum above to obtain the key rate. First, Lemma 3 in
[PAB+09] allows us to consider only Bell-diagonal states. Briefly, the argument relies
on the fact that Alice and Bob symmetrize their marginals, together with a suitable
local change of basis placing Alice and Bob’s measurements on the X,Z plane of the
Bloch sphere. The state σAB can thus be characterized by its eigenvalues, which
are the diagonal elements in the Bell basis. We denote these values by the tuple
λ = (λΦ+ , λΨ−, λΦ−, λΨ+), with the subscript denoting the Bell basis element. Lemma 4
in [PAB+09] gives us the bound
h(λ)− h(λΦ+ + λΦ−) ≤ h
(
1 +
√
(Smax(σAB)/2)2 − 1
2
)
. (18)
where h is the Shannon entropy.
Recall that for state σXE , H(X|E) = H(σXE) − H(σE). The state σE has the
same eigenvalues as σAB since σE is the purification. The eigenvalues are given by λ, so
H(E) = h(λ).
In [PAB+09] the state σXE may be calculated from equations (28) through (31)
in the proof of Lemma 5. We sketch the calculation here. Alice and Bob share the
Bell-diagonal state σAB and we give Eve the purification in system E giving a combined
state of
∑
x
√
λx |x〉AB ⊗ | ex〉E, where x ranges over the Bell states. We trace out
Alice’s system and measure Bob’s to obtain a classical system X in place of the system
B. Bob’s measurement can be parameterized on the Bloch sphere as cosφZ + sinφX .
The resulting state σXE is specified in equations (30) and (31) in [PAB
+09] and equation
(32) gives the eigenvalues to be§
Λ± =
1
4
(
1±
√
(λφ+ − λψ−)2 + (λφ− − λψ+)2 + 2 cos 2φ(λφ+ − λψ−)(λφ− − λψ+)
)
(19)
each with multiplicity 2. This gives H(σXE) to be 1 + h(Λ+), which is maximized for
φ = 0 where Λ+ = λφ+ + λφ
−
. We obtain
H(X|E) = 1 + h(λΦ+ + λΦ−)− h(λ). (20)
The secret key rate is thus bounded below by
1− h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
− h(q) (21)
where H(X|Y ) = h(q) and q is the bit error rate between Alice and Bob’s raw keys. This
is the same asymptotic rate achieved in [ABG+07]. Note that there is no relationship
between S and q, since Alice’s raw key comes from an unknown measurement. Her
measurement may measure ρ or some other system. In all cases it is possible for q to
range from 0 to 1, regardless of the value of S.
§ The states and eigenvalues in [PAB+09] are actually for Eve’s system conditioned on Bob’s
measurement outcome, but it is an easy matter to adapt them for our use.
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3. Security for arbitrary strategies
3.1. Block diagonalization of measurement operators
The following lemma is originally due to Jordan [Jor75], but has been rediscovered many
times. Modern proofs appear in [Mas06] and [PAB+09]. We will use the formulation
appearing in [PAB+09].
Lemma 4 (Pironio et al. [PAB+09] Lemma 2). Let A0 and A1 be two Hermition
operators on H with eigenvalues 1 and -1. Then A0 and A1 can be simultaneously block
diagonalized with block sizes 2× 2 and 1× 1.
Corollary 1. Let A0 and A1 be two Hermition operators on H with dimension 2n or
2n − 1 and eigenvalues 1 and -1, then there exists an isometry F from H to Hn ⊗ H2
and Hermition operators Aa,z on H2 with eigenvalues 1 and -1, such that
F (Aa) =
∑
z
| z〉〈z | ⊗ Aa,z (22)
This corollary says that we can think of applying one of these two observables as
first applying a projection to learn z. The value of z then simultaneously determines a
measurement strategy for either measurement setting. Importantly, the projection onto
z can be applied before learning the measurement setting. This will allow us to consider
an arbitrary strategy as a probabilistic combination of qubit strategies.
3.2. Reduction to qubit strategies
Let Aaj be the observable for Alice mesaurement on the jth trial with setting a, and
analogously for Bob. We apply corollary 1 to pairs of observables A0j and A
1
j (B
0
j and
B1j ) to obtain isometry Fj (Gj), from the Hilbert space of the original state to ZAj ⊗H2
(ZBj ⊗H2). The result is that we can map Aajj (Bbjj ) to∑
zj
Πjzj ⊗A
a,zj
j (23)
with the Πjzj commuting for different j, and analogously for B
b,wj
j with projectors Π
j
wj
.
We have mapped a strategy of Eve to a strategy with state ρ on Hilbert space
Z ⊗ (H⊗n2 )A ⊗ (H⊗n2 )B with measurement operators of the form above. Note that we
may perform a projective measurement with projectors Πjzj for each j to determine
all the zj and analogously for Bob’s side to determine the wjs before determining the
measurement setting without changing anything, since these projectors commute with
the measurements Aaj and B
b
j . Eve loses nothing by performing this measurement herself,
so we may assume that she does so and learns each zj and wj. The result is equivalent
to if Eve prepared a mixture of qubit strategies. We may further suppose that Eve holds
the purification for each possible qubit strategy and only increase her power.
We have reduced all possible strategies to a mixture of strategies on qubits. If Eve
in fact performs such a mixture strategy, then for each qubit strategy in the mixture,
either the key is secure, or the protocol aborts with high probability.
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4. Open problems
There are two main open problems left for this protocol of device independent QKD
(see [PAB+09] for some others). The first is to remove the restriction that the devices
have no memory. As discussed in [PAB+09] the devices may be restricted to classical
memory since any quantum memory could instead be teleported forward using extra
EPR pairs in the state and classical memory.
The second open problem is to find an effective means of dealing with channel
losses and inefficient detectors. The detector efficiency loophole quickly translates
channel losses and detector inefficiency into low key rates if they are treated as noise.
This severely limits the practicality of the current DIQKD schemes with the present
technology. See [PAB+09] for an in-depth discussion.
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